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Michael Stanker 
On October 26, 2001 President Bush signed the United and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act, or the USA PATRIOT Act.1 The bill was passed by Congress in 
response to the horrific events of September 11th, 2001. President Bush, at the 
behest of the Attorney General and the Justice Department, expeditiously effec­
tuated the approval of the legislation through the House and Senate in order to 
expand the powers of law enforcement for the purpose of protecting the 
American people from further terrorist activities.2 The bill was immediately 
derided by the American Civil Liberties Union because it “gives the Attorney 
General and federal law enforcement unnecessary and permanent new power to 
violate civil liberties that go far beyond the stated goal of fighting terrorism.”3 
Three of the most politically controversial aspects of the PATRIOT Act are the 
provisions that liberalize grand jury secrecy rules, enhance surveillance capabili­
ties, and provide a new definition of “domestic terrorism.” Some aspects of the 
PATRIOT Act are necessary and completely reasonable, given advances in tech­
nology and the very real threat of terrorism. However, other facets of the act have 
a chilling effect on our most sacrosanct political liberties. 
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Grand Jury Secrecy 
The grand jury in the federal criminal justice system wields a tremendous 
amount of power, and as a result has been accorded certain protections and 
rights in order to prevent abuse.4 A grand jury in its investigatory phase, is not 
subject to limitations other federal police agencies are, and as a result they can 
compel witnesses to testify, consider illegally seized evidence, and they do not 
have to cite probable cause for subpoenas.5 Since grand juries wield such awe­
some powers, their proceedings are all secret.6 This practice dates back to the 
17th century, and has been considered of paramount importance to maintaining 
the integrity of the grand jury system.7 
The effect of secrecy is twofold, “first, acting as a shield protecting the accused, 
and second as a sword wielded by the government to ferret out wrongdoing.”8 A 
grand jury investigation is to determine whether a trial should be held. If an indi­
vidual is under investigation, but exonerated from wrongdoing, his reputation is 
not disparaged. If the proceedings of grand juries were not kept secret it would 
be too easy for information to leak to the press, and thus embarrass people who 
have done nothing wrong. Secrecy also aids the government as well. Witnesses 
are much more likely to give complete and truthful testimony if they know their 
words will not come back to haunt them. For example, a mob informant would 
feel safer testifying in front of a grand jury because he knows what he says is 
sealed, as opposed to testifying in a court where everything said is a matter of the 
public record. The secrecy of grand jury proceedings is of paramount impor­
tance to maintaining the system’s effectiveness, and of protecting those who fall 
under its gaze. 
Under the provisions of the PATRIOT Act, foreign intelligence and counterin­
telligence information gathered by the grand jury can be shared with a host of 
other federal agencies.9 In the past, the only way to share information obtained 
by a grand jury was if it was to be used by those directly involved with federal law 
enforcement, or if a judge issued a court order, and often those were limited and 
specific. Now however, for the first time, “disclosures of grand jury material with­
out a court order for the purposes unrelated to the enforcement of federal crim­
inal law” have been permitted.10 The Justice Department’s desire to obtain grand 
jury information, without the supervision of a judge, can easily be understood. 
The Justice Department could use the grand jury as a tool to further its own 
investigations, and as long as the information relates to foreign intelligence in 
some way, it can be used indiscriminately by the rest of the federal government.11 
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 The definition of foreign intelligence is particularly broad in the PATRIOT 
Act. It refers to any “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activ­
ities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or for­
eign persons.”12 Clearly, this is an overly broad definition of foreign intelligence, 
and the potential for abuse is great. While the need for some new disclosures cer­
tainly may exist, at the very least they should be subject to judicial oversight; that 
way the appropriate authorities expeditiously receive information pertaining to 
legitimate national security needs, and information pertaining primarily to 
criminal investigations is kept secret. The new expansive definitions of what 
types of materials can be shared, coupled with the complete lack of impartial 
oversight, fundamentally changes the nature of the grand jury system in the 
United States. 
Furthermore, if Congress had seriously considered easing rules relating to the 
sharing of grand jury information then surely they would have found that 
requiring a judge’s approval was not too much to demand. A judge is impartial, 
and therefore is able to give an unbiased assessment whether or not the infor­
mation the agencies are requesting actually pertains to foreign intelligence, or 
whether it is only valuable to criminal matters. If testimony is sought from an 
immigrant about a crime committed in his neighborhood that information 
could be shared under the guise of foreign intelligence, and since there is no 
oversight, no one can stop this from occurring. The problem with this is that the 
likeliness of their testimony leaking becomes more probable, not because other 
agencies would act with malice, but because the more information is passed 
around the less secure it becomes. 
Over time the new information sharing rules of the PATRIOT Act have the 
potential to render the grand jury irrelevant in almost all matters. If people come 
to accept that a grand jury investigation is no different from any other investiga­
tion in practice it will suffer all of the ills regular federal law enforcement agen­
cies do when trying to obtain relevant information. Also, since the grand jury has 
few restrictions it can be used to violate American’s constitutional rights in ways 
prohibited to the FBI and other federal agencies. 
While the intent of sharing information pertinent to national security is cer­
tainly important, in reality the way this is carried out is flawed. It is highly unlike­
ly Congress would have passed these new secrecy-sharing provisions if it con­
fronted them directly, but since they were hidden in the PATRIOT Act, they sailed 
through our nation’s legislative branch with minimal scrutiny. The power grand 
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juries wield, combined with these new rules, poses a significant threat to 
American political liberties. A body once viewed with reverence now stands to be 
used by shortsighted government officials who are unconcerned with the 
Constitutional rights of Americans. 
Government Surveillance 
Other troubling provisions of the PATRIOT Act are those that expand govern­
ment surveillance powers. Two of the main provisions are sections 206 and 218 
of the act.13 Starting with President Franklin Roosevelt, executive surveillance 
related to foreign intelligence was long considered a right given to the execu­
tive.14 However, in the 1970’s the “Senate Select Committee to Study Government 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” also known as the Church 
Committee, uncovered widespread abuses committed by the intelligence com­
munity.15 As a result of the committee’s findings the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) was born. Its function is to formalize the process by 
which presidents monitor individuals and groups for foreign intelligence pur­
poses within the United States.16 Legitimate intelligence gathering was in no way 
hampered by the new requirements. However, FISA did lay down ground rules 
for judicial supervision of foreign surveillance. Now the executive branch has to 
go through a special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in 
order to receive a warrant to electronically monitor an individual’s residence or 
business.17 Despite the hope that this court would provide a check on possible 
executive abuses, in over twenty years of existence, the FISC has only denied one 
application for surveillance.18 Furthermore, the requirements that govern FISC 
electronic monitoring are not held to a strict level of judicial scrutiny.19 In order 
for the government to engage in electronic surveillance for criminal investiga­
tions, they must show probable cause that a crime was, or is about to, be com­
mitted. Also, the surveillance comes up for judicial review every thirty days.20 
This ensures that individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated by 
intrusive government surveillance. Foreign intelligence surveillance, on the other 
hand, is not held to standards nearly as stringent. After a warrant for surveillance 
is granted, it expires after ninety days, instead of thirty, but no judge keeps track 
of how long surveillance has been underway, so indefinite monitoring can easily 
occur.21 While some might claim that the old FISA was too liberal in granting the 
President electronic surveillance authority, it was an honest attempt to balance 
constitutional protections with national security interests. 
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The new PATRIOT Act provisions that change FISA give the government an 
unreasonable amount of power over electronic surveillance capability. FISA 
required that the primary purpose of surveillance was to gather foreign intelli­
gence, but under PATRIOT Act amendments, only a significant purpose of the 
surveillance must be for foreign intelligence purposes.22 This is troublesome 
because it creates a legal loophole that could be exploited by the government to 
use the less stringent FISA surveillance standards to monitor criminal activity. 
This has the effect of making an end run around the Fourth Amendment, by hid­
ing behind executive privilege, to monitor people and organizations if they pose 
a threat to national security. In US District Court v. US the Supreme Court found 
that Presidential right to surveillance does not extend to domestic threats, but 
only to foreign intelligence gathering.23 While the events of September 11th 
would be classified as foreign intelligence (since Al Qaeda is a foreign organiza­
tion bent on the destruction of the United States), mundane criminal cases do 
not. Should FISA be used for criminal purposes under the guise of intelligence 
investigations, it would pose a serious threat to our liberty because of the rela­
tively few restrictions placed upon FISA surveillance. 
Roving Wiretaps 
A third troublesome expansion of government power is in their newfound abil­
ity to gain easy access to roving wiretaps. Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act allows 
the government to acquire roving wiretap authority “if the effect of the suspects 
phone switching prevents effective monitoring.”24 Considering the ubiquitous 
nature of cellular telephones and other electronic communication, this provision 
can be justified given that the government must be able to carry out its duties 
regardless of technological advances. However, this law, when combined with 
another provision that allows for non-suspects to be monitored if they simply 
come into contact with a suspect, is frightening.25 Since the federal police agency 
in question can now easily gain roving wiretaps, and can monitor other people, 
whoever the suspect comes into contact with may be placed under surveillance! 
If, for example, person A is being monitored by the FBI, and she make a phone 
call on person B’s phone, person B’s phone can now be wiretapped. Prior to 
adoption of the PATRIOT Act, it would have been almost impossible to prove 
probable cause in such a scenario. Also, since FISA surveillance has minimal judi­
cial oversight, this monitoring could, in theory, go on indefinitely. The PATRIOT 
Act modifies FISA in ways that most civil libertarians find patently offensive. 
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Almost any investigation can hide under the guise of an intelligence investiga­
tion, and thus be exempt from constitutional restraints. While these enhance­
ments might help monitor terrorists, the price for our liberties is too high. 
Domestic Terrorism 
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the PATRIOT Act is its creation of a new 
kind of terrorism, domestic terrorism. Prior to President Bush signing the bill into 
law, there were three types of terrorism: international terrorism, terrorism tran­
scending national borders, and federal terrorism.26 The September 11th attack 
falls within these categories, as well as the Oklahoma City bombing, and the first 
World Trade Center attack. The types of activities that fall within the new domes­
tic terrorism category can only be described adequately as violent acts commit­
ted by politically dissident domestic groups. 
There is little debate in our society that violence is a major problem, but clas­
sifying violence as “terrorism” is not what an open society should do. In order for 
a group to be classified as a domestic terrorist organization, a violent act carried 
out in the name of the group is all that is necessary.27 This causes dilemmas for 
two types of organizations: religious groups and politically dissident groups. 
While religion has always held a revered place in America, it has not been free 
from government interference and surveillance. In the 1980’s, several Protestant 
churches in the southwest were monitored because they were believed to be har­
boring illegal immigrants.28 While this might bother some, the churches were 
engaged in illegal activity, and the authorities had shown probable cause in order 
to monitor them. Now however, if the FBI wanted to keep a mosque under elec­
tronic surveillance, it easily could do so without probable cause or effective judi­
cial oversight. Even though a distinct majority of its members might be United 
State’s citizens, the government could claim members of the mosque had been 
engaged in acts of violence, and therefore the entire organization should kept 
under surveillance. Furthermore, since the PATRIOT Act also amended the rules 
dealing with surveillance, there would be almost no accountability. 
Additionally, politically dissident groups can fall under the category of 
“domestic terrorists.” In a country as diverse as ours, differing political ideas 
flourish. Most members of these groups do not resort to violence to see their 
objectives reached. However, if a few members used violence to achieve political 
ends, the entire organization could be labeled as a domestic terrorist organiza­
tion.29 This has a chilling effect on free speech because any number of groups 
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might stop their protest activities due to fear of government retribution. There is 
no need for the government to have created this new type of “terrorism,” since its 
only purpose seems to be to restrict groups that hold unpopular views. 
The effects of being labeled a domestic terrorist are even more frightening than 
the ease in which one can fall into that category. A person who is labeled a 
domestic terrorist is subject to more governmental surveillance and enhanced 
penalties.30 Certainly, those who are terrorists must be punished severely, but 
people engaged in legitimate political protest might find themselves subject to 
these harsher penalties. 
Conclusion 
While lawmakers might have been under the impression that the USA PATRIOT 
Act gave law enforcement the necessary tools to fight terrorism, in reality it 
enhanced government power to investigate regular crime at the expense of our 
political liberties. Our notion of the grand jury has been steeped in the American 
psyche since the founding of our country. Now however, it has the potential to 
be little more than a tool used by the Justice Department as a means to work 
around our constitutional rights. Also, our privacy rights have been severely 
eroded. Electronic surveillance now can be used much more extensively, and 
without the probable cause safeguard so cherished by Americans. All the Justice 
Department needs to do is disguise its intent under the name of “foreign intelli­
gence.” Finally, our rights of political association have been severely attacked. 
Members of politically dissident groups can easily be labeled as terrorists, and as 
a result face harsh punishments, and unreasonable scrutiny. Many members of 
Congress did not have a chance to review the bill before they voted on it, but that 
surely is no excuse for such egregious violations of our rights.31 The provisions 
of the Act go too far in their attempt to catch and monitor potential terrorists. 
While the new rules may aid the government in its “War on Terror,” the price we 
pay in the loss of protection of our civil liberties is too high. 
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